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 1 Introduction 
Although the precautionary principle has been widely accepted in Europe as a basis for 
decision making about Genetically Modified (GM) crops, there are many perspectives 
on its interpretation and how it should be implemented. The PEG project is analysing 
how current European practices compare with different accounts of the precautionary 
principle. It has been examining different people’s accounts of precaution and their 
views on the procedures for regulating and managing GM crops, in seven EU member 
states1.  
Workshops with the potential end-users of our research findings are an integral part of 
the PEG project. Workshops have been carried out in each of the partner’s countries. 
These scenario workshops offer a policy analysis tool that enables a more action 
orientated approach to policy research. They help bridge the gap between research and 
the policy process by involving people at an early stage of the project, and ensure that 
our research questions and findings are embedded in the policy process.  
This report discusses the outcomes of the UK workshop, ‘GM Futures? Scenarios for 
GM Crops’, held on 5th February 2003 at the Royal Horticultural Halls, London. The 
workshop used three policy scenarios as a tool for considering the causes and 
consequences of commercialisation of GM crops. Rather than attempting to predict the 
future, by mapping different scenarios the workshop attempted to draw out dynamics 
and interactions which may not otherwise be obvious. 
Workshop participants came from a range of backgrounds and were all involved in the 
policy process either directly as a member of a Government department or advisory 
committee, or through their position within their organisation. A key policy-relevant 
outcome was the way that the three policy scenarios - to go ahead with 
commercialisation, to postpone it further or to commercialise GM crops in a limited way 
- might all present the Government with equally complex and difficult consequences. 
Further, while limited commercialisation may appear to be an attractive policy option, 
the scenario map drawn by the participants indicated difficulties that would need to be 
handled in order for limited commercialisation to be regarded as a potential option.  
 
2 Use of scenarios 
Scenarios are used to describe possible futures. Since its original development by 
strategic planners after World War II (Alcamo, 2001), scenario planning has been used 
extensively by companies for considering their strategic visions and by researchers 
interested in modelling the causes and consequences of what may happen in the future 
(Van der  Heijden, 1996). Scenario exercises have several purposes: 
• they can make unspoken assumptions apparent  
• they are a way of incorporating creativity into rational analysis 
                                                     
 1 The PEG project has research partners in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain and the 
Netherlands. The project is co-ordinated by the UK team. In the initial phase of the PEG project information 
was gathered from documents released by all the relevant policy actors. Preliminary interviews and telephone 
conversations were also conducted with a range of representatives from Government, farmers groups, 
environmental non-government organisations (NGOs), consumer organisations and industry. People were 
asked for their views on GM crops and the relevance of the precautionary principle and its use.  
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• they enable exploration of options for turning unrelated social, technological, 
economic, ecological and political information into a framework for decisions and 
judgements 
• they can be used to anticipate and explore understandings of potential risks 
• they are a way of exploring things that are not immediately obvious  
• they can question the conventional wisdom 
• they may uncover new strategic options  
• they may generate emergent ideas from people’s interactions 
• they may enable people to learn from one another and develop or revise their 
understandings of the world.  
This workshop used scenarios to link policy and research. It builds on experience 
gained from a previous workshop held in 1999 at the end of a study funded by the EU 
on risk regulation of GM crops (Carr et al., 2000; also OUBPG, 2000). This workshop 
offered a policy analysis tool that provided: 
• an immediate check on the likely response of stakeholders to the policy implications 
of research findings (or of each other’s responses)  
• a way of checking out any assumptions we, the researchers, may have made about 
other people’s views  
• a way of making sure our research is policy relevant and revealing aspects we may 
have neglected 
• material for informing the later stages of our research on precaution.  
Further, for such a controversial topic, it offered a way for different stakeholders to 
explore different policy scenarios in an open, imaginative and non-confrontational way, 
i.e. it provided a ‘safe’ environment in which people could air issues of concern.  
It should be noted that scenario mapping is a way of exploring different futures, not 
predicting the future. As Berkhout and Hertin (2002) point out, rather than being an 
objective fact, the future is socially constructed and as such there will be a diversity of 
opinions about what it will look like. It therefore cannot be treated as being real but 
rather must be treated as a set of possible alternatives depending on a person’s 
viewpoint. The aim within this workshop was to attempt to capture some of the 
complexity of views on the situation in the UK for GM crops and to consider potential 
dynamics and interactions that are not necessarily obvious and which may be important 
for decision making.  Further, the activity was not designed to look for agreement on the 
scenarios or produce any kind of consensus view on a particular scenario.  
3 Choice of scenarios 
In the UK workshop we used decisions associated with commercialisation of GM crops 
as a way of discussing precaution. We used commercialisation rather than precaution 
as the focus for the workshop discussions for several reasons. First, commercialisation 
involves making practical policy decisions, and we are mainly interested in precaution 
as it relates to practice. Secondly, any decision about commercialisation inevitably 
involves some interpretation of precaution, however narrowly or broadly defined. 
Thirdly, the issue of commercialisation provided scope for a broad discussion, 
encompassing divergent views of the precautionary principle and its relevance. 
During this workshop, participants were asked to use their respective expertise to 
explore different policy scenarios about GM crops. Rather than choose scenarios far 
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into the future, three scenarios were chosen which were considered plausible policy 
options for present decision makers: 
1. Commercialisation is postponed further. 
2. Limited commercialisation goes ahead. 
3. Commercialisation goes ahead. 
4 Details of the event 
A letter of invitation to the workshop was sent to over 60 key stakeholders involved in 
the general debate about GM crops in the UK. They covered a broad range of expertise 
- farmers’ groups, industry, Government officials and committee members, consumers 
groups, and NGOs. The event attracted 20 participants in addition to one of our 
European project partners and the members of the UK project team. 
As a result of the recent initiation of a ‘formal public debate’ in the UK, the workshop 
was able to form part of current activities to engage people in discussions on GM crops. 
However, while this has had many advantages, such as creating significant interest by 
policymakers in our research on the PEG project, it also meant that key stakeholders 
were in demand for many different events at the time of our workshop. As a result some 
groups, particularly the NGOs, farmers and consumers, were not well represented. 
Representatives approached from these groups did, however, express a wish to be 
kept informed of the workshop outcomes and have been invited to comment on the 
draft workshop report and scenario maps. 
The final participants attending the workshop are listed in Appendix 1. Many of those 
attending were from a scientific background. They were all involved in the policy 
process, either as officials in the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs or 
as members of the Government’s advisory bodies the Advisory Committee on Releases 
to the Environment (ACRE) and the Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology 
Commission (AEBC), or through their role in their organisation, for example as director 
or head.  
The workshop was managed by a professional facilitator and it was agreed that no 
remarks from the discussions would be attributed to a particular individual. The agenda 
for the day may be found in Appendix 2. Following an introductory talk by Professor Phil 
Dale on the work of the AEBC, the researchers on the PEG project briefly summarised 
their findings so far, as described in the background document sent to participants in 
advance of the workshop (see Appendix 3) and represented in cartoon form in 
Appendix 4. The participants were then divided into three groups and asked to consider 
the possible causes and consequences of the three policy scenarios for GM crops. 
The exercise used a carousel method that allowed each group to make contributions to 
all three scenarios. Groups were encouraged to consider as many causes and 
consequences as possible for each scenario and these were written on post-it notes. 
Each group then returned to their initial scenario and sorted the causes and 
consequences into themes before giving a short presentation briefly explaining these 
themes to the other groups.  
Following lunch the groups were provided with a short talk and instructions (see 
Appendix 5) on how to create scenario maps by linking the material, gathered 
throughout the morning, into logical sequences. Each participant was able to present 
their viewpoint by adding a new sequence if their view was not consistent with those of 
the rest of the group. The final maps represented an amalgamation of the group’s 
views, so that not all participants necessarily agree with all that appeared on the 
scenario map.  
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Once the maps were complete, each group gave a short presentation on their scenario 
to the other groups. The day was closed with reflections on the event by Professor Alan 
Gray, Chair of ACRE (see Appendix 6).  
5 Observations from the scenario maps 
After the event the researchers drew some policy-relevant initial observations from the 
scenario maps created at the workshop and the process of creating them (see 
Appendix 7 for the scenario maps).  These observations were circulated to participants 
soon after the event to allow them an opportunity to comment before this report was 
written (see Appendix 8). 
5.1 Scenario 1: Commercialisation is postponed further 
Participants identified fewer causes of this scenario than consequences (see Figure 1a 
and 1b in Appendix 7). This is interesting, given the pressures that exist for partial 
(Scenario 2) or full commercialisation (Scenario 3). It may reflect the fact that 
postponement is increasingly the status quo, and it is often easier to maintain the status 
quo than to bring about change. Possible causes of further postponement of 
commercialisation were seen as the lack of agreement on co-existence rules, evidence 
of the creation of super-weeds, and problems with significant gene flow and health 
scares, leading to revisions to the risk assessments. Other possible widespread causes 
included the unpopularity of GM, changes in the confidence of US farmers in GM crops, 
and the constraints of EU thresholds for adventitious presence of GM material, resulting 
in a lack of political will and the collapse of the market for GM crops. 
Participants identified a large number of diverse and often problematic consequences. 
General themes in the consequences related to trade, agro/environment, alternative 
agriculture, and regulation and its impact on public confidence, and industry and 
science. There was some disagreement, particularly on consequences for public trust. 
Some consequences were contradictory, that is, participants thought both were 
possible, for example, confidence in the regulatory system amongst members of the 
public could go up or down as a result of postponing commercialisation. The scenario 
was viewed as likely to have negative consequences for industry and science, as the 
UK would be denied the potential benefits of GM technology, and farmers would be 
unable to compete in international markets. Yet there was also the view that 
postponement of commercialisation could result in opportunities for the UK. For 
example, the UK could become an important supplier of GM-free commodities. If 
government was forced to re-direct agricultural funds from biotechnology to other 
options, then key domestic markets could be secured, thus reducing the impact on UK 
agriculture from cheaper, imported food. This might also promote new opportunities for 
conversion to organic farming, although this might lead to an oversupply of organic 
products. Overall the consequences of this scenario were viewed negatively by 
participants. 
5.2  Scenario 2: Limited commercialisation goes ahead 
The second scenario was more difficult for participants and there are fewer links in this 
scenario map as the group ran out of time (see Figure 2a and 2b in Appendix 7).  
Initially participants made little headway on the causes and consequences of this 
scenario because much time was spent on discussing what the term ‘limited’ meant in 
this context. The scenarios had been deliberately worded as simple one line statements 
to encourage participants to develop their own storylines for the scenarios through 
discussion. However, this group felt uncomfortable with the lack of a more 
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comprehensive explanation of what ‘limited’ commercialisation meant. Despite these 
difficulties, this scenario generated some of the most interesting observations. 
Participants in this group divided their consequences up into sectors – for example, 
regulatory, commercial, farmer - but then became confused over how plausible causes 
might correspond to those sectors. Discussions over the meaning of ‘limited’ raised 
important issues. Participants had different ideas about what limits were plausible and 
how they might happen. There were discussions over what situation ‘limited’ was 
relevant to, for example, whether it meant anything less than all crops being 
commercialised. It was pointed out that ‘limited’ commercialisation already exists as GM 
grain is being used for animal feed and that even Scenario 3, ‘Commercialisation goes 
ahead’, would still have limits (for example, it would still be regulated). There were also 
discussions over how to structure the scenario map since it was felt many of the issues 
could be described as both a cause and a consequence. The difficulties that 
participants  experienced suggest that even though at first sight Scenario 2 appears to 
be the likely political compromise, its outcomes or consequences are no less 
problematic than those of Scenarios 1 or 2. 
In contrast to Scenario 1, a larger number of causes than consequences was identified. 
Potential causes of limited commercialisation included Government inability to take a 
decision; difficulties with legal liability or GM testing costs; no market for some products; 
problems with public acceptance; difficulties with co-existence for particular crops; 
changes in food policy; the commercial viability of particular crops.  
The potential consequences of limited commercialisation were identified as: new 
research opportunities, further intensification of agriculture and improvements in UK 
trade as the increase in consumer choice provides a market, although limited 
commercialisation might also result in food companies sourcing from non-GM areas. 
However, farmers in GM areas might also lose the option of growing GM-free crops. 
The possibility was also identified of limited commercialisation allowing experience to 
be gained of the technology, enabling people to become more comfortable with it, 
although the opposite might also occur. 
It was observed that limited commercialisation may be likely to occur because it is an 
attractive political compromise. It would provide an opportunity to accommodate all 
sides in the controversy. However, the discussion of consequences established that in 
practice this may leave almost all the existing problems unresolved whilst at the same 
time adding new ones. One person commented wryly that one consequence would be 
that  environmental lawyers would benefit. 
5.3  Scenario 3: Commercialisation goes ahead 
This scenario generated fewer causes than Scenarios 1 or 2, and fewer causes than 
consequences (see Figure 3a and 3b in Appendix 7). Possible causes included the lack 
of identification of problems with GM technology; the satisfactory completion of risk 
assessment trials; positive results from the Farm Scale Evaluations, and public 
acceptance. However, public apathy and a lack of application of the precautionary 
principle were also noted as possible causes. 
Among the consequences for this scenario, the main themes generated concerned the 
science base, trade, co-existence and farming practices, and enhanced biodiversity. 
Increased investment in the UK science base as a result of ambitions for the UK to be 
at the forefront of biotech development could improve the UK research base. However, 
commercialisation might bring the UK into conflict with the EU. Difficulties might occur 
as a result of gene-flow, leading to co-existence issues. Changes in farming practices 
could lead either to an increase or a decrease in agricultural intensification and 
agronomic problems for farmers. Commercialisation might lead to a more competitive 
agriculture with improved economic and environmental benefits. Improved consumer 
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choice might lead to improved and cheaper food products. However, it might also lead 
to higher demands for organic products, resulting in increased imports.  
There was considerable disagreement on the consequences of this scenario. Critically, 
consequences could be determined by the success or failure of a small number of 
regulatory mechanisms e.g. segregation and labelling. However, views differed on what 
outcome would count as ‘success’ or ‘failure’. For example, if gene flow resulted in 
contamination, this could be seen as a failure of the regulatory system even if threshold 
values were not breached. 
Although there were a number of negative consequences to this scenario, the general 
response by the participants was more positive than that to Scenario 1, which is 
probably a reflection on the type of expertise, or worldview, of the majority of the 
participants.  
6 Common issues 
Several important general observations can be made from the scenario mapping 
exercise: 
• There was much commonality of issues across the three scenarios. This was 
evident from the themes that participants identified. Common issues included: 
difficulties surrounding co-existence and public acceptance, effects on agricultural 
strategies and practices, and investment in research and development. 
• Participants tended to classify causes and consequences of scenarios according to 
themes, e.g. regulatory issues, market issues, social issues. In some cases themes 
were used for convenience as it was not easy nor obvious how to classify clear 
causes or consequences. Such themes are useful, but during the mapping exercise 
they meant that in some cases chains of causality tended to be identified within 
(rather than across) themes. However, there was limited time in which to do the 
mapping exercise and given more time it is possible that further cross links would 
have been explored.  
• Participants often offered causes and consequences that were informed by an 
idealised model of the situation or that represented ideal understandings of 
institutional capacity to control or manage practices. For example, that further 
postponement of commercialisation might force Government funds in the direction 
of agriculture and result in the development of agriculture in ‘a more sound 
direction’, was raised in Scenario 1. Another example, from Scenario 3, was the 
tendency to invoke perfect regulation. Regulations that operated perfectly made 
specific negative consequences of commercialisation, such as health risks, 
‘impossible’. Idealised representations of scientific research and economically 
rational businesses were also often invoked.  
• The sometimes contradicting chains of causes and consequences within the 
scenarios probably reflect the uncertainties associated with GM, allowing 
contrasting interpretations or predictions based on people’s different 
understandings. 
• Many of the chains of consequences reflected the expertise or interests within the 
group. For example, Scenario 3 has a chain relating to investment in the UK 
science base which half-jokingly ends with the consequence ‘I still have a job’. It 
also suggests that the under-representation at the workshop of certain types of 
expertise limited the diversity of ideas represented in the maps. 
9 
• Some consequences were viewed as more certain to occur than others, leading 
some participants to ask if consequences should be weighted according to their 
certainty. In other cases participants were unsure which of two contrasting 
possibilities might occur, for example, agricultural intensification or improvements in 
agricultural sustainability. Although the combined expertise of the participants was 
considerable, many consequences lay beyond consensual predictions.  
• Some elements of the GM debate were striking by their absence from the scenario 
maps. For example, the debate about uncertainty was missing. Although the Farm 
Scale Evaluations were mentioned in Scenario map 3, there was little attention 
given to their role and what information is required from them before 
commercialisation is allowed to go ahead. The precautionary principle was only 
mentioned in Scenario 3 and was not actively discussed by the workshop 
participants. However, it is implicit in all the scenario maps. For example in 
Scenario 1, causes such as health scares and horizontal gene flow led to 
consequences such as revising the risk assessment and the postponement of 
commercialisation, and in Scenario 2, one line of causality suggests that limited 
commercialisation occurs for ‘safer’ products only. 
7 Observations on the process 
Despite the limited amount of time available for the scenario exercise, a rich variety of 
causes and consequences were identified and mapped. Most of the participants knew 
each other and immediately felt reasonably comfortable with the tasks set for them and 
worked well together.  However, each group functioned differently. For example, one 
group discussed the causes and consequences and appointed a scribe to write them 
down, whereas in the other groups, individuals or sub-groups wrote their own phrases. 
The causes and consequences could not therefore be read as a group or consensus 
view.  
The exercise was designed to enable people to express their views. However, there 
was a tendency for participants to become stuck in arguments over the consequences 
of a particular scenario. In some cases the process of scenario building was slowed 
down by participants attempting to correct the ‘misconceptions’ of another group 
member. Some members of the groups were more dominant than others and there 
were cases of participants policing the ideas. This mirrors the way processes (or 
institutions) can become blind to possible/plausible causes or outcomes of decisions. 
Nevertheless, despite this, differences of opinion were generally accommodated 
through the generation of a new line of causes within the scenario.  
The main type of scenario that the groups were allocated may have influenced how the 
group functioned. For example, the scenario ‘commercialisation is further postponed’ 
may have been easier to consider because it involved a continuation of the present 
situation. The causes were therefore taken for granted, although the consequences 
provoked much discussion.  
The discussions around the scenarios were as important as the map building exercise 
itself. The interactions were successful in raising many important issues of common 
concern as well as points of disagreement. Although Scenario 2 was considered by the 
participants to be difficult to interpret, the discussions generated by trying to resolve this 
difficulty were important in raising issues that may occur for this scenario in practice. 
For example, how limited might limited commercialisation actually be and how difficult 
might such limits make its implementation.  
In the final discussion, as already mentioned, the question was raised of giving more 
weight to particular views according to the evidence available to support those views. 
For example, since there is wide scientific agreement that gene flow will occur, this view 
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could carry more weight. Although there are tools and approaches that can be used to 
follow on with an activity that weights variables in this way, there was not time within the 
workshop to do this. 
The issue of the validity of the scenario exercise was also raised in the final discussion 
as participants were concerned there was no way of testing the statements. However, it 
was noted by another participant that although scenarios may be plausible they are not 
designed to be verifiable. They are an attempt to capture some of the potential future 
issues. While some participants felt concerned over the open-ended character of the 
exercise another commented that this was a strength of the exercise. As there is no 
clarity on many of the issues, the nature of the exercise allows many voices to be heard 
rather than assuming that scientists speak with one voice. Another participant remarked 
that future uncertain consequences must be taken into account by government policy 
and that the exercise throws up a host of issues people are concerned about and which 
the government has to take on board. Another commented that the diagrams may also 
be useful for identifying potential interventions and practices relevant to a participant’s 
situation. 
8 Conclusion 
The workshop provided policy relevant insights into decision making for GM crops. 
Analysis of the UK report in relation to the reports from the workshops held in the PEG 
projects partner countries is likely to provide further insights. Important issues arose 
from the group discussions, particularly for Scenario 2 where there was discussion over 
what ‘limited commercialisation’ might mean in practice. The scenario maps generated 
by the workshop are not an attempt to predict the future and can only indicate what the 
causes and consequences of a particular decision might be. However, the large number 
of consequences generated for each scenario indicate that, like many environmental 
issues, there are complex and interacting consequences involved in any decision for 
GM crops. They indicate the difficulties with making any decision on commercialisation 
work. The scenario maps highlight the potential for particular chains of events to occur, 
although they also draw attention to the way people have a tendency to evoke idealised 
situations when considering GM futures. The maps indicate that no one of the three 
scenarios - Commercialisation is postponed further, Limited commercialisation goes 
ahead or Commercialisation goes ahead - is without difficulties. Each scenario is likely 
to present its own series of future problems. For example, the scenario map for the 
compromise scenario, Scenario 2, indicates the particular difficulties that this scenario 
may present for any decision on GM crops, and that it may therefore potentially be no 
more likely to resolve the GM debate than either of the other scenarios. As with the 
other scenarios, this scenario presents both difficulties and opportunities, for example, 
the limited introduction of GM crops offers opportunities for advancing learning about 
any potential wider impacts of this new technology.  
Valuable insights and experience were gained from this workshop. Together with 
experience gained from the parallel workshops held by project partners in other EU 
countries, observations from this workshop are being used to inform the design of an 
EU-level workshop in Brussels and inform the overall findings of the PEG project.  
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Appendix 2: Workshop agenda 
 
‘GM FUTURES? Scenarios for GM Crops in the UK’ 
5th February 2003, 10:00 – 17:00 
Royal Horticultural Halls, London 
 
Agenda 
 
Time Item Who 
10.00 Coffee & registration 
To include “Post it” note exercise on key issues 
 
10.30 Welcome and introduction to the day Dave Wield 
10.40 Opening talk Phil Dale 
11.00 Presentation of key points from UK Study Sue Oreszczyn 
11.15 Examining the 3 Policy Scenarios – Groupwork 
“Carousel” activity to explore the key issues around each of 
the 3 policy scenarios 
Mark Yoxon 
12.30 Reporting back 
Concise summary presentations from each group 
All 
12.50 Close and brief insight into the afternoon session Mark Yoxon 
13.00 Lunch  
14.00 Scenario mapping 
Brief presentation on scenario mapping 
Sue Carr 
14.10 Issues into Actions – Introduction 
Drafting maps for each policy scenario 
Mark Yoxon 
14.15 Working Groups 
3 working groups, each with an OU facilitator – task is to 
draft a scenario map  
All 
15.15 Reporting back 
Concise summary presentations from each group 
All 
15.45 Break  
16.10 Reflections on the day Alan Gray 
16.40 Close 
Followed by an informal drinks reception 
Dave Wield 
The policy scenarios are as follows: 
• Commercialisation is postponed further. 
• Limited commercialisation goes ahead. 
• Commercialisation goes ahead. 
15 
Appendix 3: Background document sent to the 
participants 
 
Precautionary Expertise for GM Crops (PEG) 
EC Research Programme: Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources 
Project QLRT-2001-00034 
 
 
Background Information for the UK Workshop: 
 ‘GM FUTURES? Scenarios for GM Crops in the 
UK’ 
 Royal Horticultural Halls, London 
5 February 2003 
 
 
Sue Oreszczyn 
Centre for Technology Strategy, Faculty of Technology,  
The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK76AA 
Tel: +44 (0)1908 653433/654782 
s.m.oreszczyn@open.ac.uk
 
1  Introduction  
Although the precautionary principle has been widely accepted in Europe as a basis for 
decision making about GM crops, there are many perspectives on its interpretation and 
how it should be implemented. The PEG project is analysing how current European 
practices compare with different accounts of the precautionary principle. It has been 
examining different people’s accounts of precaution and their views on the procedures 
for regulating and managing GM crops, in seven EU member states2.  
Workshops with the potential end-users of our research findings are an integral part of 
the PEG project. The purpose of the workshops is to involve people at an early stage of 
the project, to help ensure that the research questions and findings are policy relevant. 
Each research partner will be holding a similar national workshop in their own country, 
and the outcomes will inform an EU-level workshop, to be held in Brussels later this 
year. 
In the UK workshop we shall use decisions associated with commercialisation as a way 
of discussing precaution. We have used commercialisation rather than precaution as 
the focus for the workshop discussions for several reasons. First, commercialisation 
                                                     
2 The PEG project has research partners in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, and the 
Netherlands. The project is co-ordinated by the UK team. In the initial phase of the PEG project information 
was gathered from documents released by all the relevant policy actors. Preliminary interviews and telephone 
conversations were also conducted with a range of representatives from Government, farmers groups, 
environmental non-government organisations (NGOs), consumer organisations and industry. People were 
asked for their views on GM crops and the relevance of the precautionary principle and its use.  
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involves making practical policy decisions, and we are mainly interested in precaution 
as it relates to practice. Secondly, any decision about commercialisation inevitably 
involves some interpretation of precaution, however narrowly or broadly defined. 
Thirdly, the issue of commercialisation provides scope for a broad discussion, 
encompassing divergent views of the precautionary principle and its relevance. 
The purpose of this document is to inform the discussion of scenarios at the UK 
workshop, by summarising the results of our research so far. In particular, it focuses on 
the current issues relating to the commercialisation of GM crops in the UK, the different 
understandings of precaution, and communication and inclusion. 
2  Current issues relating to the 
commercialisation of GM crops  
Accounts of precaution and precautionary practices for GM crops in the UK are 
operating within the current debate concerning potential commercialisation of herbicide 
tolerant crops. Some of the main issues currently being debated or mentioned in 
interviews are summarised briefly below. 
Managed development 
In October 1998 the UK Government, with the co-operation of industry, announced a 
delay in the commercialisation of approved GM crops, proposing instead a ‘managed’ 
development. The Government’s view was that biotechnology was a way of increasing 
agricultural efficiency and attracting investment to create a more competitive industry. 
While industry are convinced of the safety and benefits of GM crops, many people 
remained concerned about the potential dangers particularly to the environment. A 
major obstacle to commercialisation in the UK has proved to be the controversy over 
the impact broad-spectrum herbicides may have on wildlife habitats. Concern has been 
particularly acute as 69% of the land in the UK is registered as agricultural holdings 
(Countryside Agency, 2002) and there are few remaining ‘wild’ areas.  
In response to these concerns, Government has established the Farm Scale Evaluation 
(FSE) research programme. Industry has agreed to delay commercialisation of 
approved crop varieties while large scale farm evaluations are conducted. 
Nevertheless, as a precautionary measure the Farm Scale Evaluations have been 
controversial. Rather than settle matters they have intensified debate by providing a 
focus for peoples concerns.  
Expanding expertise  
The emphasis on scientific knowledge as a basis for GM decisions is being challenged 
by the AEBC and NGOs. Their concerns have led to an increasing openness in expert 
judgements, and greater input into the decision making process by a wider range of 
stakeholders. In 1999 the Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) 
was broadened to include more agro-ecological expertise and members with direct links 
with the biotechnology industry were removed. 
At about the same time (mid. 2000), the Government set up the Agriculture and 
Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC), to complement the scientific advice 
provided by ACRE. The AEBC advises on the broader and longer-term strategic issues 
surrounding agricultural biotechnology. It draws Government’s attention to people’s 
concerns and has highlighted the limitations of a narrow scientific risk assessment. In 
its report Crops on Trial (AEBC, September 2001), the AEBC proposed a more 
participatory approach and raised concerns, such as the scientific limitations of the 
FSEs, the adequacy of the risk assessment procedures, the question of separation 
17 
distances, and the need to protect the interests of organic farmers. They also noted that 
wider philosophical and ethical concerns, such as those about the manipulation of 
nature, are not being adequately addressed, and that the FSEs would not be sufficient 
alone to reach a decision about commercialisation. 
The establishment of the AEBC is widely regarded as an acknowledgement of the need 
for a broader framework that allows for legitimate factors other than science to be 
considered. It has sought ways for such concerns to be more formally elicited, analysed 
and documented. It has also allowed criticism of current structures to be given a higher 
profile in the political arena. Industry representatives, however, point out that the role of 
the AEBC in an evidence-based approval system remains unclear (House of Commons 
2002, Annex).  
Although the Government is attempting to broaden expertise beyond official bodies, 
stakeholders remain critical of the way that expertise is still being limited. For example, 
ACRE are criticised for lacking a public interest group representative or a lay person 
(Five Year Freeze, 2001) and their limited remit has been commented on by the NFU. 
Their lack of a Welsh representative has been pointed out by Friends of the Earth 
Wales and by the Welsh Agri-Food Partnership’s Organic Strategy Group. The quality 
of expertise for examining uncertainties is also under criticism, for example, the 
adequacy of the scientific evidence and the scientific abilities of ACRE have been 
questioned over approvals for T25 maize. Further, critics argue that advisory panels 
should formally take account of the wider farming and environmental implications when 
granting consents to market products, for example, whether the use of herbicide 
tolerant plants is a good strategy for weed control in the long term, both environmentally 
and agronomically.  
Co-existence 
A major concern highlighted by public responses to the FSEs is about the co-existence 
of GM and non-GM agriculture. This is particularly acute in regions where organic and 
less intensive agriculture are important components of the local economy, such as 
Wales and the western areas of England and Scotland.  
The Welsh National Assembly (WNA) has set its own policy on precaution regarding 
GM crops and co-existence. It is applying the most restrictive approach possible within 
the EU legislation. Agriculture in Wales consists of predominantly small farms, and so 
there is concern over the potential for cross-pollination of neighbouring crops. This is 
related to the increasing area of organic production in Wales and farms involved in agri-
environment schemes. The WNA put the issue of co-existence firmly on the EU agenda 
when they used powers devolved to them under the UK’s Environmental Protection Act 
to impose legally enforceable separation distances. The Assembly argued that “a broad 
interpretation of Article 16 allows ‘protection of the environment’ under the directive to 
include protection of an environment where organically pure crops can be grown.” 
(Annex to Aventis prohibition notice.) An Article 16 notification was triggered by the UK 
Government under the EU’s Deliberate Release Directive. The Government argued on 
behalf of the Welsh Assembly that the T25 maize would involve a “risk to the 
environment” and that the Part C consent granted had not addressed the issue of 
safeguards for neighbouring GM crops (letter from the UK Permanent Representation to 
the EU, 13.7.01).  
In Devon, local councillors have considered declaring the county GM free (Phelvin, 
2003). While in Scotland, local people and NGOs have called for Scotland to be 
declared GM free. There has been strong local opposition to the GM crops planted for 
the Farm Scale Evaluations. Scottish Natural Heritage have particularly expressed their 
concern over the impacts on the wider countryside and the rural economy and the need 
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to ensure that monitoring is not used as a substitute for risk assessment (Williamson, 
2001).  
Thus there is a tension between the national and local positions on GM crops, which 
has highlighted the conflicting views of the organisations representing the diverse 
farming community within the UK. It has also emphasised the way that the risk 
assessment process makes narrow assumptions about socio-economic concerns.  
Desirable agricultural futures 
Issues surrounding co-existence have highlighted the need for GM crops to be 
incorporated into wider debates over desirable agricultural futures, implying a more 
holistic approach to agriculture than is currently being applied. 
A common concern expressed by interviewees for this project is the potential for GM 
crops to increase agricultural intensification. The use of GM crops could lead to an 
accelerating loss of biodiversity and be in conflict with the UK Biodiversity Action Plans. 
Intensification could result from the varieties used or from management practices, for 
example, a further increase in the area of winter sown crops could reduce plant 
diversity and the species dependent on it. However, this is not perceived simply as a 
GM issue. As one interviewee commented, “it depends on how we use GM crops and 
there is good evidence that conventional crops affect biodiversity”.  
Therefore, for many people, uncertainties over potential changes in farm management 
and the effects on biodiversity, and the concerns about gene flow and gene stacking, 
suggest there is a need to consider GM plants as crops in a wider context rather than 
as an isolated technology. They call for discussions to be set within a wider debate 
about the kind of agriculture society wants.  
 
3  Understandings of Precaution 
Different interpretations of precaution were evident in the accounts people gave of the 
issues surrounding GM crops and commercialisation. These understandings of 
precaution offer a way of framing the issues described in the previous section.  
Some people are concerned that the precautionary principle could be used for ulterior 
motives; for example, industry groups are concerned over the potential for precaution to 
stifle innovation or to be used as a tactic for delaying commercialisation, others view it 
as an opportunity for greater fairness, openness and inclusiveness. In its report Crops 
on Trial (September, 2001) the AEBC comments that a precautionary approach should 
be holistic, protecting those affected by an activity rather than those who benefit, 
acknowledging the complexity of the real world and recognising the vulnerability of the 
natural environment. At the other end of the spectrum, the Soil Association, while taking 
precaution seriously, comment that GM and non-GM are simply incompatible, therefore 
precaution becomes irrelevant. The main themes to emerge from the initial interviews 
are shown in Table 1. They represent elements of peoples thinking, therefore, a 
persons understanding of precaution may comprise of more than one theme. 
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 Table 1: Emerging themes on precaution and GM crops in the UK 
 
 Examples 
Precaution as proceeding 
with care 
Precaution is something people do anyway, that they exercise all 
the time. Industry does it already with new products.  
Precaution is about “proceed with great care” – the precautionary 
principle is exercised all the time in areas where there is 
incomplete knowledge.  
Precaution as good science It is a necessary part of good scientific practice. 
Precaution as a rational 
approach/framework for 
decision making 
Implementing the precautionary principle should not be based on 
emotions.  
Some stakeholders are particularly keen that a greater following 
for the EC’s communication on the precautionary principle will 
lead to a more rational approach to decision making.  
Arguments against irrational precaution refer to the way nothing 
has happened yet– no detrimental health effects, no 
contamination of organic agriculture during field trials. 
Precaution as a means for 
greater openness 
Transparency is particularly important for NGOs and farmer 
groups, For example, calls for results of any monitoring 
programmes to be in public domain.  
The AEBC is a good example of attempts at openness in 
government committees. 
Precaution as a mechanism 
for placing policy decisions 
within a societal context 
We should question the need for the technology in the first place. 
 It should also mean the inclusion of an evaluation of all possible 
options.  
Precaution should involve widening decisions beyond a narrow 
scientific base. 
Precaution as a pretext The public debate will be indecisive, Government will use it to 
back their decision either way. 
Precaution as inclusive Precaution means including more views.  
The public debate is viewed as playing an important role in 
opening up the debate.  
 
Precaution as fair The costs and benefits of GM technologies are not necessarily 
evenly distributed.  
NGOs call for consideration of this in the assessment process. 
Precaution as a means for 
stifling innovation 
Concern that the precautionary principle will be used to prevent 
technological developments.  
Commercialisation of GM crops will go ahead, it is just a question 
of time. The precautionary principle should not be invoked to 
slow development down. 
Precaution as a delaying 
tactic 
Precaution is viewed as slowing things up, to delay the decision–
making process for as long as possible.  
Given time the public will change their views and this will be 
reflected in Government decisions. 
Precaution as an iterative 
and flexible process 
Moving with the situations as they change, as the technology 
develops. Precautionary measures need to be flexible, they need 
to be appropriate to the different products and contexts. 
Precaution as a reputation 
enhancer/as demonstrating 
responsibility 
Business may utilise precaution to demonstrate their ability to be 
responsible. There is a growing realisation that it is an essential 
element in the corporate environment.  
Growing concern over the way that NGOs/media conduct 
themselves in GM debates – calls for greater responsibility. 
Precaution as a long term 
view 
Provides an opportunity to consider the future – should be a long 
term rather than a short term view. 
Precaution as irrelevant No commercialisation of GM crops means there is no need for 
precaution. 
 
There has been no common view or consistent approach to the precautionary principle, 
in general, in the UK. With respect to the EC communication on the precautionary 
principle (EC, 2000), those questioned were aware of the document, which was 
considered useful or a step in the right direction, but they had not necessarily referred 
to it recently or did not necessarily know its content in detail. Government and some 
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organisations, such as the Consumer’s Association (see, Consumer’s Association, 
2002), the Crop Protection Association and English Nature, have been developing their 
own interpretations of the precautionary principle, some based on the EC 
Communication, translating them into practical guidelines for dealing with uncertainties 
in their own particular field. For other organisations, the precautionary principle is not 
necessarily articulated as such, but is more an underlying feature of their perspectives. 
They rarely use the word uncertainty in the narrow way it is used in the EU document 
and consider precaution as more a general way of acting rather than something to be 
triggered.  
The different themes on GM crops suggest that precaution and the precautionary 
principle are considered by people in at least two different ways: as a precise ‘toolkit’ 
i.e. a set of steps to follow, and as a mindset, i.e. an underlying or implicit aspect of a 
person’s perspective. This difference has also been noted by Willis and Oldham(2002) 
who considered the precautionary principle in general. A tension therefore exists 
between the need for more formal approaches to precaution with a clear procedure, as 
set out in the EC Communication (EC, 2000), and a more open process. That is, 
between something which is triggered and something which is a more general way of 
acting.  
Thus, for GM crops in the UK, precaution has tended to operate as a process rather 
than a formal set procedure. There are a range of views all providing valuable input into 
the negotiation over the path that society should take. It is an ongoing process, drawing 
in more expertise, both strategically and unintentionally, and creating new institutional 
practices and alliances. 
 
4  Communication and inclusion  
NGOs remain critical of ‘expert’ led, top-down approaches to risk management and the 
lack of recognition of broader societal concerns. ‘Experts’ making decisions are viewed 
as being insulated from the risks and are criticised for not taking communication 
seriously. For example, the National Consumer Council (2002) comments “traditional 
risk communication typically sees the process as an add-on at the end of the risk 
management process”, exemplified by Government’s attitude of “we make the decision 
and then we tell you what the decision is”. They are critical of what they see as the ‘one 
way dialogue’ . 
Communication is thus an important ongoing process for precaution and it is 
increasingly being promoted by all stakeholders. Industry is forming alliances, for 
example the Agriculture Biotechnology Council (abc) (see abc 2002), and so are NGOs. 
Opportunities are arising for industry and NGO’s to come together and communicate on 
issues of concern, for example at workshops and seminars (see Willis & Oldham, 2002 
and Environment Council, 2001). There is now greater communication between 
Government committees and between those committees, NGOs and the wider public. 
The broadening of expertise and inclusion of a diversity of views is an on-going 
process. The expertise changes as members of bodies such as the Advisory 
Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) and the AEBC change, as their 
sub-groups focus on new issues and draft in or take evidence from additional expertise, 
and as they interact with one another. The establishment of the AEBC as a new 
structure has led to the establishment of further formal structures to engage with the 
wider public. They have also suggested that a “network of social researchers” be set up 
to consider public responses to new technology which would produce a continuous 
body of “improved social intelligence” for use in Government decision making (AEBC 
September, 2001). The official ‘public debate’ (see the following section), through which 
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the Government has encouraged participation by organisations as well as the general 
public, will further draw in an increasing diversity of views and generate further 
understandings and actions. The interactions among the different stakeholders (Figure 
1) promote opportunities for policy learning.  
Figure 1: Institutional Influence Diagram in relation to UK GM crop decisions – 
January 2003 
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Public debate over GM crops has been gradually intensifying and is set to intensify 
further as the results of Farm Scale Evaluations (or GM maize, oilseed rape and sugar 
beet) become available. Through a process of an official ‘public debate’ the 
Government aims to restore people’s confidence in science as a basis for policy 
making. “The intention is to create a dialogue between all strands of opinion on GM 
issues” (Government response to AEBC, April 2002). The official ‘public debate’ 
represents a step forward in engaging with people’s concerns. It has the potential to link 
expert judgements with broader public concerns and is an opportunity for developing 
mutual learning. However, the process is not without critisim. Academic advisors have 
also questioned assumptions underlying the Government funded public debate, such as 
the capacity of science to resolve uncertianties and accommodate public concerns 
(Burgess et al., 2002). 
5  Concluding remarks 
The decision-making system for GM crops is complex. It remains unclear how and to 
what extent the various elements - the formal ‘public debate’, further research, and the 
results of the FSEs - will link into policy making and the decision on commercialisation 
of GM crops. Questions remain, for example, over how much research would be 
considered enough for such a decision. For the Government it is seen as a way “to 
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identify the questions which the public has and provide information in response” 
(Meacher, Hansard,15 July 2002) and for industry as a means for educating people. 
Nevertheless, it represents a more formal approach to broadening expertise to include 
the wider public in an “overall programme of dialogue”, and an opportunity for 
embracing complexity through the inclusion of many perspectives. 
The Government has shifted its position and gradually accepted that a decision on 
commercialisation will not be as easy as originally thought. Government structures are 
increasingly opening up, both intentionally and unintentionally, to wider expertise. 
However, there is a tension between the constraints at the European level and the 
process of opening up at the national level. The EU regulations still disregard socio-
economic aspects of concern for many stakeholders. Further, concern over the co-
existence of different types of agriculture in different regions highlights the need for 
national and European structures that adequately address the needs of local areas. 
The policy to broaden regulatory expertise has set in motion a process of inclusion of 
expertise beyond Government expectations and control. It is a process that may 
complicate the stated Government claim of restoring public confidence in science. For 
many people, restoring trust in the decision making process means not just 
encompassing more perspectives but also being open to different outcomes. It means 
going beyond the ‘expert’ led, top-down, science based model, towards a more 
inclusive and holistic precautionary process. 
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Appendix 4:  Picture representing key UK 
issues for GM crops 
Picture representing the key UK issues for GM crops. Used in the workshop 
presentation. 
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Appendix 5: Information sheet on how to draw 
the scenario maps 
Scenarios – causes and consequences 
Constructing a multiple cause and consequence diagram 
The aim of the exercise: 
to sort the causes and consequences into logical sequences 
Subsidiary aims: 
• to identify gaps in the sequence 
• to think about possible interactions between consequences, and possible 
unintended consequences 
• to consider how various actors might respond, leading to further consequences 
• to stimulate further ideas/insights about consequences 
Steps: 
For the purposes of this exercise, the group who initiated the discussion of a particular 
scenario takes responsibility for constructing the diagram for that scenario.  
Each group needs to appoint one person to act as co-coordinator/facilitator and another 
as rapporteur. The group needs to gather around a table where all the post-its can be 
displayed. 
1. Place post-it with the scenario in the middle of a large sheet of paper on the 
table. 
2. Place the causes of the scenario above the scenario post-it, and the 
consequences below the scenario post-it. 
3. Organise the causes in sequence, so that one leads to the next, which leads to 
the next and so on until the one that leads to the scenario.  
4. Do the same for the consequences, leading from the scenario. 
Note that there is likely to be more than one chain of causes and consequences. Feel 
free to create as many chains as necessary. 
5  Draw arrows from each cause and consequence to the next in the sequence 
 (the arrow signifies ‘could lead to…’ ‘might cause…’, ‘might affect…’ ‘might 
 contribute to…’.) 
6. Check through each chain to see if it makes sense. Clarify meaning if 
 necessary. If there seems to be a missing link, write a new post-it that fills the 
 link.  
If you disagree with the group’s ordering, add your own order to the diagram (using 
copies of the post-its) or, if you prefer, construct your own diagram on a separate sheet 
of paper. 
See example overleaf. 
7. Pause to consider if other arrows should be added (e.g. links between different 
chains of consequences, or links backwards to an earlier consequence or 
cause). This may involve re-arranging the diagram to make these links clearer. 
8. Pause to consider if any new causes or consequences occur to you as a result 
of the diagram – e.g. how might different actors respond to each link in the 
chain? 
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Example: Diagram of possible causes and consequences of GM salmon being approved in the UK 
 
GM SALMON  
APPROVED IN 
UK
US GM salmon 
trials 
completed
US approves 
GM salmon
GM salmon on 
sale in US
Pressure on UK 
to accept US 
GM salmon
UK salmon 
succumb to 
disease
UK salmon in 
short supply
GM salmon 
farms 
established
Price of salmon 
falls sharply
?etc ?etc ?etc
GM enters 
wild salmon 
gene pool
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Appendix 6: Reflections on the day by Alan 
Gray, Chair of ACRE 
Thank you for the invitation to offer reflections on the day.  I have five main points: 
1. These scenarios lie outside my field.  But there was a commonality of issues 
across the three scenarios, regardless of what is done – (except for the effects 
on world trade in the commercialisation scenario). 
2. A cascade of things happen once a decision is made.  There may be 
unavoidable and irreversible consequences, with no going back. 
3. Our anticipation of such consequences influences what is done at the top of the 
scenarios, i.e. causes. 
4. The debate about uncertainty was missing, e.g. about FSEs and their role.  
What do you need to know before you go ahead?  How far must we deal with 
uncertainty before permitting releases? 
5. GM crops have a platonic aspect, i.e. generic issues spanning the sector.  But 
the consequences of commercialisation depend on the specific crop and the 
construct.  I could have engaged better with specific cases, e.g. herbicide-
tolerance. 
Social scientists argue that science is inseparable from values and I agree the science 
has an enormous and important social context.  As an advisory committee, however, 
we depend upon an empirical core of consensual scientific views.  If another expert 
group were presented with the same evidence, then we must assume that they should 
reach a similar conclusion.  Science has been built on this basis. 
GM did not begin in 1999.  To the bystander it must seem like science is always playing 
catch-up.  For example, people say ‘You didn’t think about the Monarch butterfly’. But 
we did.  How we explain the detail, beyond the sound-bite level, is a great challenge.  
For example, antibiotic resistance is widely seen as a general problem, e.g. of the 
transgene transferring to pathogenic organisms.  But ACRE have looked carefully at 
specific cases and concluded, for example, that  spectinomycin/streptomycin markers 
would not be a good idea.  People seem unaware that after 2004, antibiotic-resistance 
genes will not be allowed under the EC Directive.  How do we explain this detail and still 
engage the public? 
People complain that science says, ‘On the one hand … and on the other hand.’  
Certainly sloganising may be more effective to get public attention than dealing with the 
detail.  How do we get beyond sloganising? How should we deal with uncertainty?  
There’s a core of testable science that is agreed.  Most scientific conclusions by 
advisory committees are verifiable.  But arguments about evidence, which are usually 
conducted through obscure journals, are now being thrashed out in very public arenas. 
People often say, ‘But you don’t know enough about it’, and therefore that you should 
apply the precautionary principle by delaying judgements about safety.   It is difficult to 
refute such an assertion – the nature of science is that we will never know everything, 
nothing is without uncertainty, or indeed possible risks.  For absolute certainties you 
must look elsewhere.  Scientific advice must be evidence-based and rational. 
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Appendix 7: Scenario maps 
Figure 1a: Scenario 1 Commercialisation is postponed further (causes) 
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Figure 2a: Scenario 2 Limited commercialisation goes ahead (causes) 
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Figure 3a: Scenario 3 Commercialisation goes ahead (causes) 
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Figure 3b: Scenario 3 (consequences) 
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Appendix 8: Initial feedback sheet to 
participants 
 
‘GM FUTURES? Scenarios for GM Crops in the UK’ 
Brief observations  
 
THE EVENT: ‘GM FUTURES? Scenarios for GM Crops in the UK’ was a scenario 
building workshop held on 5th February 2003 in London. The workshop was organised 
by the Open University as part of a research project, ‘Precautionary Expertise for GM 
Crops’ (PEG), funded by the European Commission. Parallel workshops are being held 
by project partners in several other EU member states. 
OUTCOMES: Policy-relevant observations on decision making for GM crops in the UK. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE DAY: A range of stakeholders attended the workshop, including 
members of ACRE, the AEBC, industry, Government, and academia. The event was 
managed by a professional facilitator and conducted under Chatham House rules. 
Following introductory talks the participants were divided into three groups and asked to 
consider the “possible causes and consequences” of three policy scenarios for GM 
crops: (1) commercialisation is postponed further; (2) limited commercialisation goes 
ahead; (3) commercialisation goes ahead. Each group then “mapped” such causes and 
consequences for one scenario. Professor Alan Gray, Chair of ACRE, closed the event 
with reflections on the day. 
Policy-relevant observations can be drawn from the scenario maps created and the 
process of creating them. 
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE SCENARIO MAPS: Some observations are specific to 
particular scenarios and others are generic. 
SCENARIO 1 Commercialisation is postponed further: Participants identified fewer 
causes of this scenario than consequences. This is interesting, given the pressures that 
exist for partial or full commercialisation. This may reflect the fact that postponement is 
increasingly the status quo, and it is often easier to maintain the status quo. However, 
participants did identify a large number of diverse and often problematic consequences.  
Some consequences were contradictory, that is, participants thought both were 
possible, such as confidence in the regulatory system amongst members of the public 
could go up or down as a result of postponing commercialisation. 
SCENARIO 2 Limited commercialisation goes ahead: Participants grouped the 
causes and consequences of this scenario according to themes - social, legal, political 
and commercial. Concerning causes, one of the most interesting observations was that 
limited commercialisation might occur because it is an attractive political compromise. It 
would present the opportunity of accommodating all sides in the controversy. However, 
the discussion of consequences established that this might in practice leave almost all 
the existing problems unresolved whilst at the same time adding new ones.  
SCENARIO 3 Commercialisation goes ahead: As with scenario 1, participants 
identified fewer causes than consequences. Similarly, there were many examples of 
contradictions being involved.  For example, a cause such as “the government ignores 
science” or the “government accepts science” could each result in commercialisation. 
This probably reflects different value positions on GM crop issues. There was also 
considerable disagreement on the consequences of this scenario. One observation was 
that, consequences could be determined by the success or failure of a small number of 
regulatory mechanisms e.g. segregation and labelling. However, views differed on what 
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outcome would count as “success” or “failure”. For example, if gene flow resulted in 
contamination, this could be seen as a failure of the regulatory system even if threshold 
values were not breached. 
Common issues: Two important general observations can be made. (1) Participants 
tended to classify causes and consequences of scenarios according to themes e.g. 
regulatory issues, market issues, social issues.  Such themes are useful but during the 
mapping exercise they meant that chains of causality tended to be identified within 
(rather than across) themes. This structure made it difficult to capture the complexity of 
the real world.  At the same time, it may reflect the way in which the thinking of people 
involved in the policy process can be restricted. (2) Participants often offered causes 
and consequences that were informed by an idealized model of the situation. One 
example, from Scenario 3, was the tendency to invoke perfect regulation. Regulations 
that operated perfectly made specific negative consequences of commercialisation 
“impossible”. Idealized representations of scientific research and economically rational 
businesses were also often invoked. 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROCESS: Despite the short amount of time devoted to 
the scenario exercise, a rich variety of causes and consequences were identified and 
mapped. However, each group functioned differently. For example, one group 
discussed the causes and consequences and appointed a scribe to write them down, in 
the other groups, individuals or sub-groups wrote their own phrases. The causes and 
consequences could not therefore be read as a group or consensus view. Although 
generally the exercise enabled people to express their views, there were cases of 
participants policing the ideas. In this way processes (or institutions) can become blind 
to possible/plausible causes or outcomes of decisions. 
The main type of scenario that the groups were allocated may have influenced how the 
group functioned. For example, the scenario “commercialisation is further postponed” 
may have been easier to consider because it involved a continuation of the present 
situation. The causes were therefore taken for granted, although the consequences 
provoked much discussion. The second scenario was more difficult because 
participants had different ideas about the meaning of the word “limited”. They discussed 
options which included limitation by crop, trait, product use and geographical area. 
Follow-up 
A draft report will be circulated for comment in March.  The final version will be made 
publicly available as an output from the PEG research project. 
Along with the other national workshops, observations from this one will inform the 
design of an EU-level workshop in Brussels. 
 
17th February 2003 
Contact: Sue Oreszczyn 
Centre for Technology Strategy  
Faculty of Technology  
The Open University 
 Walton Hall  
Milton Keynes MK76AA 
Tel: +44 (0)1908 653433/654782 
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